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Abstract  
Two major innovations have inter alia emerged from the land reform in Madagascar: (i) 
decentralised land management through the creation of local land offices, and (ii) 
certification, which enables individuals to register private property provided the community 
agrees on the legitimacy of the claimed rights. 
 
Despite the political crisis and the withdrawal of international aid during this period (2009 - 
2013), new local land offices have been created, and now cover a third of the country’s 
communes. These Local Land Offices have had mixed success: 33% are operational 56% are 
experiencing problems and 11% are inactive. They have the major advantage of breaking the 
administrative monopoly on land matters, but face some serious challenges in updating their 
information systems, becoming financially sustainable (via the challenge of land tax 
collection) and integrating the land governance system (co-arbitrating disputes and 
managing land with customary authorities, dealing with local practices to secure land). 
 
Far from being the preserve of the elite, certification seems to be relatively accessible to 
women, migrants and those with little education. It is far more popular than registration, but 
uptake is still low, with just 9% of households in communes with a land office applying for 
certificates. This highlights the importance of separating the formalisation of land rights from 
processes that secure land tenure. 
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1. A policy based on registering property rights 
Since 2005, the land laws that underpin this reform (Laws 2005-019 and 2006-031) have 
revoked the presumption of state ownership and created untitled private property so that local 
land rights can be legally recognised. In parallel with registering and issuing land titles, a 
demand-led system of certification has been introduced to formalise private property (not 
other sets of rights to land and natural resources) in the name of one or several individuals  
(not for a group or community).1 Certification and certificates differ from registration and 
titles in that they are only intended to register existing, socially validated ownership rights 
(Teyssier et al., 2009; Rochegude, 2010). 
The 2005 land reform breaks the legal, political and institutional monopoly previously held by 
the land administration. This represents a major step forward in terms of decentralisation, 
giving the communes new competences to register land rights in local land offices (Teyssier 
et al., 2009) – but not greater subsidiarity in land management (conflict resolution, validating 
transactions, etc.) 2. It was inspired by the local recording system – found in the vast majority 
of localities and known as ‘petits papiers’3, although it does not lead to their legal recognition. 
While the role played by the chiefs of the fokontany4 and Raiamandreny (notables or elders) is 
taken into account, and they are involved in the certification process, no explicit mention is 
made of the other local customary, religious or economic authorities, whose role and 
importance in land issues varies from region to region (see also Droy et al., 2010). 
2. Progress and constraints with local land offices 
In terms of change, the most innovative and visible component of the reform has been the 
decentralisation of land management. A similar budget was deployed to modernise the land 
services5, but apart from overhauling their archives and buildings, this component has not led 
to any major organisational developments, changes in practice or impacts for users (Comby, 
2011; Andrianirina-Ratsialonana and Legendre, 2011; Thinon and Rakotoarison, 2013). 
A total of 483 local land offices were created in one third of the country’s communes in the 
space of six years. A few were autonomous initiatives, but most were set up as the funding 
became available (with costs ranging from € 12,000 to € 30,000 per office). Now that the 
process has gone beyond the pilot stage, some key questions about the future of all these 
offices and the relevance of creating new ones in every commune on the island need to be 
addressed. 
                                                 
1
 Only collectives with a formal status can formalise their land holdings, although this very rarely happens. For 
more information, see Aubert et al., 2013. 
2For comparisons of decentralisation processes in different countries see Fithpatrick, 2005; Bruce and Knox, 
2009; Lavigne Delville et al., 2001. 
3
 Petits papiers (in French) are handwritten documents accompanying transactions – sale, inheritance and 
donation, or attesting property. They can be signed by witness or stamped by the chief of fokontany or the 
commune.  
4
 The fokontany is the smallest administrative entity. The Raiamandreny that participate in local land recognition 
committees are supposed to be elected by local people (and are sometimes nominated by the mayor). More work 
needs to be done in this field, for while local people consult representatives of local religious or customary 
authorities before taking any steps to formalise their land rights, they do not envisage electing them onto these 
committees. 
5
 $US21 million to decentralise land management and $US25 million to modernise the land services, accounting 
for about 80% of the reform budget for 2005 and 2010.  
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At the moment there are local land offices in the communes that are most easily accessible,6 
those with the greatest land density and/or those already involved in by development projects. 
While this distribution is logical in terms of effective action and support (‘reaching as many 
people as possible in areas with the most serious land issues’), it reinforces territorial 
inequalities in access to public services. Furthermore, very few of the so-called urban 
communes have local land offices. This is due to the lack of an urban land management policy 
or, more exactly, to an implicit policy of territorial distribution that leaves the state land 
services with the potentially more lucrative urban areas. 
The initiators and financial backers of the reform expected the demand for land certificates to 
be high as they are inexpensive and can be quickly and easily obtained from the local land 
offices7. Yet actual uptake has been very low, with a grand total of around 180,000 
applications, and 96,000 certificates issued by the end of 2012 (see illustration 1, Land 
Observatory).This means that at the national level,  far more certificates than titles have been 
issued across the country. Nevertheless, it raises questions at the communal level, where the 
average number of applications for certificates ranges from38 to 261 per year (see illustration 
2, PNF and Land Observatory).   
The local land offices had to start operating autonomously only two years after they were set 
up, when international funding was withdrawn due to the political crisis. Some have fared 
better than others: one third have proved resilient,8 over half of them are having problems, 9 
and one tenth of the offices have ceased operating (PNF and Land Observatory, see Map 1).  
Those implementing the reform often blame the land offices’ operational problems on delayed 
technical support and lack of training. However, their fortunes are also shaped by the 
available funding and financial health of the commune concerned: it costs around $US 5,000 
to $US 7,000 (20% to 80% of the communal budget) a year to run a land office (Andrianirina 
et al., 2013). Communes have not been allocated the resources they need to exercise their new 
competences, and users have to bear a much greater proportion of the costs of certification 
than is the case with registration (Andrianirina-Ratsialonana, 2009). The successes and 
problems in these local land offices are largely determined by the municipal team’s level of 
motivation, which is both the cause and effect of the lack of social demand for legal 
formalisation.  
At the moment, the three main issues that land offices have to contend with are (Comby, 
2011):  
- technical sustainability: storing and updating data, computerisation and most crucially, the 
state administration’s lack of will to decentralize land management and to share political and 
economic advantages;  
- financial sustainability: if the cost of running the land offices cannot be covered by the 
income from certificates or (in the short term) by transfers from the State, it might be possible 
to use property tax revenues (although this is by no means guaranteed); 
                                                 
6
 Which are not all served by paved roads. 
7The certificates cost 50 times less than titles ($US9-14, compared with $US500-700) and can be obtained ten 
times more quickly (in 6 to 18 months rather than 6 to 10 years).  
8These offices have survived thanks to bridged funding (from thematic donor projects), self-funding (from local 
taxation), by raising the price of the certificates, and by reducing their activities (cutting staff from two to one, 
paying them part-time wages, reducing their opening hours and authorising agents to carry out various tasks in 
the town hall – taxation, secretariat, etc.). 
9Opening on an ad hoc basis, lacking an operating budget, dealing with files in dribs and drabs, experiencing 
virtually no demand for new certificates. 
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- social credibility: local attitudes to certificates10 are changing, especially with the closure of 
certain offices, which has led some villagers to transform their certificates into titles.  
3. Separating the processes for securing and formalising tenure 
3.1. Limited demand for certificates 
The lack of demand for this kind of formalisation is mainly due to two factors (Burnod et al., 
2012): 
- insecurity of tenure in rural areas is not as widespread as the architects of the reform 
believed. Only a small proportion of plots are disputed (2% of the parcels covered by the 
PECF study11); and while many households feel that their rights are not fully secured in the 
long term, few worry about them being contested in the short term (8.2% of households in the 
PECF study12); 
- households use a range of practices to secure land tenure and combine them depending on 
the characteristics of the parcels and territories concerned (the origin of the rights, agricultural 
quality, potential challengers, etc.; see, among others, Rakoto, 1995; Ottino, 1998; Leroy et 
al., 2006; Aubert et al., 2008; Muttenzer, 2010). The main way of securing rural land relies on 
social recognition of the holder’s rights by local peers and institutions. Petits papiers are also 
used to secure transfers and validate rights in response to or imitation of administrative 
practices (cf. Lavigne Delville, 2003). Finally, the least common option is legal formalisation 
through certificates or titles (cf. illustration 3).  
3.2. Does certification really increase security? 
There are two main reasons why people apply for certificates (Burnod et al., 2012). Firstly, 
due to a proactive desire to reaffirm their ownership rights (the poorest households do this to 
fend off concrete threats, while better-off households do this more systematically). Secondly, 
people apply for certificates as an opportunistic response to information and promotional 
campaigns in villages (72% of certificates in areas covered by the PECF study). Either way, 
certificates make their holders feel that they have greater security of tenure – in the same way 
that petits papiers do, but certificates are believed to secure the rights of future generations 
more effectively than petits papiers.  
Households mostly apply for certificate for parcels that they depend upon for their economic 
and social reproduction (such as rice fields), land that is most likely to be contested by a third 
party and/or plots that they regard as their personal property.13 () Regardless of their wealth or 
education, households rarely obtain certificates if they feel they have legitimate, recognised 
rights to a parcel, and/or do not have a whole range of rights to it, such as inherited parcels 
(op. cit).  
In a context of legal pluralism that varies from region to region, certification aims to legally 
validate only those rights that are socially recognised. This is done by informing villagers of 
                                                 
10
 Some people now mistrust the certificate because of its association with the previous government or with 
development projects.  
11
 The study on the perception and effects of land certification (PECF) was conducted by the Land Observatory, 
IRD and Cirad in four regions and nine rural communes with local land offices. It is based on quantitative 
surveys of 1,862 households and over 7,300 parcels. The results of the study represent the situation in these nine 
communes, not the island as a whole.   
12The PECF study found that in these specific cases these fears relate to interventions by a family member (50% 
of cases). 
13
 i.e. they enjoy de facto ownership and are not subject to family regulation, This is mainly the case with land 
that has been purchased; see PECF study and Boué, 2013 
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the ongoing application, getting rights validated by local committees14 and allowing this 
validation to be contested (2% of all applications submitted from 2007 to 2012 were contested 
by the end of 2012, Land Observatory). Thus, certification provides greater security of tenure 
provided the municipal teams follow the basic procedures at every stage of the process and 
the local institutions implement basic monitoring15 (although it can sometimes result in 
exclusions, especially within family groups). Unfortunately there have been instances where 
certificates are issued without following the proper processes,16, creating insecurity and 
benefiting influential individuals that villagers dare not oppose (except in a few rare cases of 
collective mobilization).  
3.2. Local land offices (not just certificates) as a factor in greater security 
While certification may lead to disputes, it can also help resolve them at the local level and in 
the courts. In most cases, local land offices act as referral rather than conflict settlement 
agencies (Burnod et al., 2012). Setting aside their role in certification, they also give local 
people greater legal autonomy upstream of the process17 (Andrianirina et al., 2012). They are 
used by households that simply wish to obtain information and which have rarely, if ever, had 
the opportunity to use the state land services.18 They are also occasionally mobilized to defend 
collective rights. Nevertheless, the local land offices cannot supply effective legal protection 
for all untitled but occupied land. Likewise, the sole legal status of untitled private property 
cannot provide this protection.19 The state land administration recognises untitled private 
property only when it wishes to do so, and when the lands are actually certified. It is not 
uncommon for state representatives (from state officers to mayors) to ignore or pretend to be 
unaware of the existence of either untitled private property or local land offices, in order to 
register land in the name of the State so that it can be leased to investors (Andrianirina-
Ratsialonana et al., 2011; Burnod et al.; 2013 a&b).  
4. Certification: a widely accessible but under-used option 
Although  the number of households that have obtained certificates is small (on average, only 
9% of households in communes with land offices have chosen this option), the PECF study 
shows that those that have done so are very varied in terms of their wealth, level of education, 
origin and geographic isolation.20. Far from being the preserve of the elite, certification 
actually seems relatively accessible – although better off and better educated households do 
tend to use more handwritten documents (petits papiers) and legal processes to secure their 
land rights (more certificates and titles). Certification is relatively inclusive but has had mixed 
results in this respect in terms of gender equity, although more work needs to be done on the 
                                                 
14
 Composed of the chief of the fokontany, people from neighbouring parcels and various Raiamandreny 
(notables and elders).  
15
 Most households are controlled by their family and local institutions, and this monitoring is made easier by the 
fact that formalisation is voluntary rather than compulsory, and there are a limited number of requests. 
16It is hard to determine how many of these fraudulent certificates exist, and although they do affect morale, they 
are limited.   
17
 Except when they scare them in order to increase demand for certificates… 
18
 The PECF study found that 20% of households had visited their local land office, while four out of five 
households had never consulted the land services. 
19Even without a certificate, the legal status of UPP is supposed to provide some legal protection because the 
land can only be registered in the name of the State or of an individual if it can be proved that there is no owner. 
20
 The PECF study shows that 10% of households in the poorest tercile have certificates; 16% of those with 
certificates have never been educated and 47% never progressed beyond primary school. 
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way that certification can lead to exclusion among siblings and migrants.21 While women 
apply more for certificates for their own plots than men do (PECF), most certificates for 
parcels that are registered as belonging to a couple (24% of parcels) are issued in the 
husband’s name rather than that of the couple.22 
5. Little added value in terms of markets, credit and investment 
There does not seem to be a firm link between formal documents proving land ownership and 
access to credit in Madagascar. Land is rarely used as collateral, and when it is, petits papiers 
and land certificates are used in the same proportion (respectively less than 0,5% of credit 
studied in the PECF23). On the one hand, the institutions/individuals that provide credit prefer 
to use physical guarantees that are easy to seize and sell, such as bicycles, cattle, sacks of rice, 
etc.; and on the other, households are reluctant to offer their land as security.  
There is certainly no mechanical connection between certification and investment. Security of 
tenure is an enabling but by no means a sufficient condition for investment. In addition, the 
legal formalisation of rights does not automatically confer security of tenure. Therefore, 
certification (which is more commonly realised after investment24) is more part of a dynamic 
of consolidating rights and securing capital than a pre-requisite for investment. 
At the moment it is too early to analyse the possible effects of certification on land 
markets (the dynamics and types of transactions, the adoption of legal registration of rentals 
or sales in the local land office or the unchanged  use of petits papiers25), as the process is too 
new and too few parcels have been certified. What is clear is that the sale-purchase and rental 
markets are very active in rural areas in Madagascar,26and do not seem to be restricted by the 
lack of legal formalisation of plots. 
6. Are these new land devices better than nothing?  
6.1. Superposition rather than substitution 
Local land offices and certificates have been appropriated to varying degrees, depending on 
the commune and local land issues, the different authorities in charge of land issues in the 
locality, the position of the communal team, and the general relationship between local people 
and the State or development projects. These devices are not a substitute for existing land 
tenure arrangements, but are superimposed upon them, thereby contributing to and interacting 
with the country’s normative and institutional pluralism. In this particular respect and contrary 
to the expectations of the founders of the land reform, land certificates do not replace petits 
papiers: 
                                                 
21
 In the PECF study, the criteria of origin did not seem to work against incomers, who account for ¾ of people 
who have been in the study site for over 10 years, and who are often better off than people who were born there. 
22
 The practical implications of this legal (rather than practical) exclusion should be studied in cases where the 
woman is divorced or widowed.  
23Few rural households covered by the PECF study had access to credit (5% of households in 2011), and those 
that did mainly obtained it through micro-finance institutions.  
24
 In the study, nearly 20% of households had invested in at least one of their parcels in the last five years 
(making improvements, changing crops, using more intensive growing practices). 
25Petit papiers are used to formalise most sale/purchase transactions (90%) – compared with just 10% of loan, 
rental and sharecropping agreements. 
26The PECF study found that 5% of parcels (9% of rice fields) are sharecropped, rented or loaned, and 37% of 
parcels had been purchased (a third of them in the last five years). 
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- certificates have considerable advantages over titles in terms of cost and timescale, but are 
less flexible, accessible and ‘established’ than petits papiers. Some users prefer the latter 
because they are cheaper (costing about €1), because of the type of authority involved 
(family, head of fokontany), and because they formalise transactions rather than rights; 
- although this is not compulsory, some land offices demand petits papiers for their 
certification records. While this reinforces and complicates the certification procedure (and 
makes it look like registration procedure), it shows that there is interaction between the 
different types of land authorities (municipal team, village chief, family): the municipal team 
(mayor and local land officer) prefer to ask the family and village chief for additional proof of 
ownership before initiating the certification process. It can also make rights holders feel that 
petits papiers are still useful and have a legal value27 and does not create an incentive to 
abandon them; 
- some local authorities benefit from the continued use of petits papiers, as they help them 
retain their power and generate income.   
6.2. From legislation to practice 
In terms of land tenure, the main impact of the reform has been to legally recognise 
local/customary land rights and break the land administration’s monopoly over the legal 
formalisation of land. However, legal recognition of land rights is only effective when it is 
accompanied by information, transparency, controls, checks and balances – otherwise the 
laws are at best meaningless or at worst lead to exclusion. 
6.3. Opportunities for decentralisation  
Thanks to the land reform,  the communes have extended their competences and are now 
focusing on new operations that combine systematic property tax registration with group 
certification (still demand-led) in order to diversify the land offices’ activities, increase their 
financial autonomy (from the State and international donors) and encourage local 
development. In doing so, the land reform focuses on formalisation rather than governance (in 
the pilot operation, each of the four communes received over 7,000 applications for 
certificates). These operations will need to address various issues:  
-  with taxation, shifting the emphasis from registration to recovery;  
-  with certification, being aware of (i) the risks of identifying rights too quickly, (ii) the fact 
that households only have a partial interest in certification28;  (iii) in fine, the risk of 
households using more tax receipts as a tool for legal protection than certificates;  
-  with this joint ‘tax registration and certification’ operation, improving tax recovery in order 
to fund common interest projects, rather than simply covering the costs of tax registration and 
meeting the operating costs of town halls and local land offices.   
6.4. Questions for the next stage of the reform 
In order to feed into the debates about the next stage in the process, the reform should: 
 draw on the systems used for petits papiers  by formalising transactions and the origin 
of rights rather than ownership, and encouraging more explicit involvement by other 
types of local authority;  
 
                                                 
27
 These petits papiers have no legal value in the strict sense, but do act as initial proof of ownership when 
disputes arise (Rochegude, 2001; Aubert et al., 2008).  
28
 In the pilot operations, households only certified 50% of their holdings on average. 
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 focus on land governance rather than formalising rights, by: 
- strengthening decentralisation (competences, resources) in accordance with other territorial 
policies and avoiding a ‘super deconcentration’ of the land services;  
- increasing subsidiarity in land management, and offering communes the opportunity to work 
and arbitrate with different types of local authorities;  
- emphasising the role that land offices can play in supporting land management, rather than 
simply registering rights (providing information, acting as points of reference in conflicts, 
mediating with State forestry, mining and land authorities, and acting as an interface between 
other types of traditional land authorities); 
- building on citizens’ mechanisms for information and control rather than relying solely on 
administrative mechanisms; 
 
 strengthen and diversify existing land offices before setting up new ones or trying new 
forms of land office (especially as the latter will be in communes with less pressure on 
land or less pressing land issues). 
6. Illustrations 
Illustration 1: Changes in the number of local land offices and land certificates, 2006-
2012 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Number of land offices 
created each year 7 27 193 101 68 53 29 
Cumulative number of 
communes with an open 
land office 
12 39 232 333 401 454 483 
Annual number of 
applications for land 
certificates 
1 751 10 176 55 996 47 485 18 320 19 694 18 146 
Cumulative number of 
applications for land 
certificates 
2 098 12 274 68 270 115 755 134 075 153 769 171 915 
Annual number of land 
certificates issued 811 1 249 18 891 32 085 11 898 10 650 20 739 
Cumulative number of land 
certificates issued 811 2 060 20 951 53 036 64 934 75 584 96 323 
Sources: Madagascar Land Observatory & PNF 
 
 
 
Illustration 2: Performance of communal land offices at the national level, 2006 - 2012 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Average 
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Average annual number of 
requests for land certificates in 
each commune 
146 261 241 143 46 43 38 131 
Average annual number of land 
certificates issued in each 
commune  
68 32 81 96 30 23 43 53 
Average conversion of applications 
into land certificates  46% 12% 34% 68% 65% 54% 114% 41% 
Sources: Madagascar Land Observatory & PNF 
 
 
 
  
  
Illustration 3: Main modes of securing 
* This illustration only considers one type of method 
several), identified by respondents as the main method
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Map 1: Distribution and status of land offices in the communes of Madagascar
Sources: Madagascar Land Observatory & PNF 
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